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UNTYING THE HANDS OF D.C.:
WAYS TO AVOID CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS WHILE
ADDRESSING SOLID WASTE DISPOSAL
Janell De Gennaro*
INTRODUCTION

Due to pressing serious environmental threats to the health and well being of
communities such as the District of Columbia, public interest law advocates must
define more precisely the philosophy of "environmentalism" and stress its necessity in resolving environmental disputes. Traditional environmentalism is explained well by author James Boyle, who stated,
[T]he environmental movement was deeply influenced by two basic analytical frameworks. The first was the idea of ecology; the fragile, complex and
unpredictable interconnections between living systems. The second was the
idea of welfare economics - the ways in which markets can fail to make
activities internalize their full costs. The combination of the 2 ideas yielded
a powerful and disturbing conclusion. Markets would routinely fail to make
activities internalize their own costs, particularly their own environmental
costs. This failure would, routinely, disrupt or destroy fragile ecological systems, with unpredictable, ugly, dangerous and possible irreparable consequences. These two types of analysis pointed to a general interest in
environmental protection and thus helped to build a large constituency,
which supported governmental efforts to that end.1
New environmentalism is explained by the National Center for Policy
Analysis:
New environmentalism focuses on decision-making processes. It focuses on
finding ways to obtain and use good information and on providing incentives for environmental stewardship. It focuses on ways of ensuring that individuals and organizations are able to express the environmental values
they hold. New environmentalism proposes the creation of decision
processes and institutions that: provide incentives for personal responsibility, stewardship and pollution abatement; help individuals cooperate to
achieve their environmental goals; improve access by individuals, firms and
other organizations to environmental knowledge; foster a balancing of envi* Janell De Gennaro (Forgy), J.D., former Deputy Editor-in-Chief of UDC Law Review, is a
member of the New York bar and is currently working at a law firm in Boston, Massachusetts.
1 James Boyle, A Politics of IntellectualProperty: Environmentalism For the Net?, 47 DUKE L.J.
87 (1997).
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ronmental values with other human values; and create conditions in which
environmental innovation and creativity can flourish.2
Thus, the essence of the philosophy that needs to be embraced by the Courts is
the balance of environmental values with other human values in limiting destructive environmental consequences of certain actions. Until recently, environmental law has been considered a vague category of issues with no clear elements,
such as in contracts or torts, that place legal issues in the "environmental law"
category. Even though statutes such as CERCLA and NEPA govern environmental policy the statutes are often interpreted in terms of whether they are unconstitutional or interfere with other state law. Also, cases that contain
environmental components, such as the environmental consequences to land resulting from a lumber company's contract with the state, are viewed as breach of
contract cases. The judicial system has not known how to handle cases that encompassed environmental issues, so the courts tried to label these cases under
other more defined areas of law. As author Richard Lazarus explains, the Supreme Court has led the country in apathy and misunderstanding of environmental law:
The Supreme Court's attitude towards environmental law during the past
three decades has generally been marked by apathy, but with the Justices
exhibiting increasing signs of skepticism and some hostility. At best, many
of the Justices do not view environmental law as a distinct area of law, but
as merely a factual context for the raising of more important crosscutting
legal issues. At worst, some of the Justices appear to see the kind of legal
regime environmental law promotes as precisely the kind of centralized, intrusive system of laws that they believe 3to be both constitutionally suspect
and unwise as a matter of social policy.
This lack of understanding and skepticism must be replaced with an understanding of the philosophy of environmentalism if our nation is going to maintain
the ecological balance necessary to sustain its citizens and a healthy environment.
Public-interest lawyers in the twenty-first century need to be the advocates for
public policy steeped in environmentalism in hopes that the courts will begin to
more adequately reflect the ecological balance that society must strive to
maintain.
Many of the environmental dilemmas that are facing our country as a whole
are reflected on a local level in the nation's capital. The District of Columbia is
currently confronted with resolving the growing dilemma of trash transfer sta2 National Center For Policy Analysis, Searching for a New Vision: New Environmentalism,
available at www.ncpa.org/studies/s201/5201b.html.
3 Richard J. Lazarus, Restoring What's Environmental About EnvironmentalLaw, 47 UCLA L.
REV. 703, 771-72 (2000).
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tions.4 Grappling with the transfer and disposal of the District of Columbia's
waste has been a contentious battle on all fronts. The D.C. Council has created
legislation 5 and numerous amendments 6 to institute waste disposal controls
through Solid Waste Permit Acts, but the D.C. courts have enjoined the enforcement of parts of that legislation.7 Private waste management companies have
objected that segments of the Permit acts are unconstitutional, in violation of the
Commerce Clause, and the courts have agreed.8 Residents have been registering
complaints with the District government about truck traffic, poor maintenance of
facilities and general failure by the District to enforce existing regulations. 9
Community activists have criticized the D.C. Council's regulations and District
management, and accused the Department of Public Works of not spending any
of the funds allocated to properly address this issue.'o Activists have held Citizens' Summits to create action plans to address the problem, such as eliminating
the number of transfer stations, cleaning up current stations, or having a transfer
station in each ward." 1 However, none of those solutions has yet been implemented due to restrictions in money, politics and the court system. 1 2 Testimony
to the frustrations that have accompanied the history of this battle, an attorney
and activist for the cause of strictly regulating and enforcing such regulation of
trash transfer stations, Myles Glasgow, believes that,
4 These sites are essentially temporary garbage dumps for small trash collector trucks to deposit
waste for approximately 24 hours until larger trucks can pick up the compacted waste and deposit it in
a Virginia or Maryland landfill. See SOLID WASTE TRANSFER FACILITY SELECTION ADVISORY
PANEL, DRAFT REPORT 3 (2000) and Myles Glasgow, Address at Citizens' Summit on Trash Transfer
Issues, Washington, D.C. (Feb. 24, 2001).
5 Recycling Fee and Illegal Dumping Emergency Enforcement Act of 1994, The Solid Waste
Facility Permit Emergency Act of 1994, 1994 D.C. Stat. 10-384, 42 D.C. Reg. 45 (1994); The Solid
Waste Facility Permit Temporary Act of 1994, 1995 D.C. Stat. 10-251; and The Solid Waste Act of
1995, 1998 D.C. Stat. 11-94, 45 D.C. Reg. 2700 (1998).
6 Solid Waste Facility Permit Amendment Act of 1998, 1999 D.C. Stat. 12-286; Solid Waste
Facility Permit Amendment Act of 1999, D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 8-1051-1063 (West Supp. 2001).
7 Eastern Transit Waste v. District of Columbia, 758 A.2d 1 (2000).
8 Id.
9 SOLID WASTE TRANSFER FACILITY SELECTION ADVISORY PANEL, DRAFT REPORT 7 (2000).
10 Myles Glasgow, Address at Citizens' Summit on Trash Transfer Issues, Washington, D.C.
(Feb. 24, 2001). Mr. Glasgow is an attorney and member of Neighbors United for Legislative Environmental Order, Proper and Responsible Development (NULEOPARD); Mr. Glasgow was heavily involved in litigating nuisance actions against improperly and illegally sited D.C. garbage and trash
transfer stations. See Citizens' Summit on Trash Transfer Contact Information, CITIZEN'S SUMMIT ON
TRASH TRANSFER ISSUES (Sierra Club Environmental Justice Program, Washington, D.C.), Feb. 24,
2001, at 2.
11 Citizens' Summit on Trash Transfer Issues, Washington, D.C. (Feb. 24, 2001).
12 See Myles Glasgow, Suggestions on What to Do About D.C.'s Garbage and Trash Transfer
Stations 10 available at http://ww.ilsr.org/recycling/historic.html (last modified Mar. 1998) (stating that
"DCRA (Department of Consumer and Regulatory Affairs) has deliberately refused to enforce any
significant part of the licensing regulations and are on record that enforcement at DCRA will do
nothing to enforce the law unless transfer stations act outrageously.").
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As a direct result of this 1992 procrastination by these D.C. agencies and

the personnel who are mostly still with us, the city is a party to at least six
court cases in the D.C. Court of Appeals and others that are headed for
trial and businesses and neighborhoods have lost significant value because
transfer stations have been improperly sited, located, designed and operated while D.C. government agencies have no clue as to how to correct the
situation.1 3
Due to the complexities of the issues involved, recent judicial decisions, 14 and
fundamental differences between environmentalism and the perspective of our

judicial system, the hands of D.C. are seemingly bound from addressing the vexing local problem of solid waste disposal. However, in this paper I will argue

there are ways to untie them without violating the United States Constitution. 15
After providing a historical background of solid waste disposal and trash transfer

stations in the District, I will argue that Congress has the ability to assist the
District through its power to consent to flow control under the Commerce clause,
its power to give authority to the District through the District Clause and Finan13 Id.
14 Waste Management Holdings, Inc. v. Gilmore, 252 F.3d 316 (4th Cir. 2001); District of Columbia v. Eastern Trans-Waste, 758 A.2d 1 (D.C. 2000); District of Columbia v. L.G. Industries, Inc.,
758 A.2d 950, 952 (D.C. 2000).
15 Many D.C. citizens argue that the poor enforcement of environmental and safety regulations
by the District and locations of the trash transfer stations is attributed to environmental racism. I
have declined to discuss this aspect of the issue of trash disposal, however refer to the following
articles and book for an in-depth discussion of environmental racism: Robert W. Collin and Robin M.
Collin, Sustainabilityand EnvironmentalJustice: Is the Future Clean and Black?, 31 ENVTL. L. REP.
10968 (2001) ("Cities and other communities of color have been waste sinks for hundreds of years.
Assuming that we would and could protect all communities equally, failure to remediate the environment of these waste sinks will only continue to degrade environmental quality for that bioregion.
Only a transformation of attitude about the connection between environment, race, and waste will
drive our behavior toward the law and politics of sustainability."); Jeffrey R. Cluett, Two Sides of the
Same Coin: Hazardous Waste Siting on Indian Reservationsand in Minority Communities, 5 HASTINGS
W.-Nw.J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 191,192 (Winter 1999), ("Church of Christ Study is considered one of
the most important analyses of environmental racism. Consequently, activists increasingly use the
Church of Christ Study, along with a growing body of other scientific research, to show that minorities
bear a disproportionate amount of the country's worst pollution .... The study made several important
findings. Race proved to be the most important variable associated with the citing of hazardous waste
facilities nationwide. The study also found that the mean value of homes was a significant factor in
the presence of hazardous waste sites. The study noted, however, that the availability of cheaper land
always influences hazardous waste citing. The fact that minorities are often present in these areas
suggests the interplay of environmental and other institutionalized racism. In communities with one
commercial waste facility, the minority percentage of the population was twice the national average.
In those communities with more than one facility, the minority percentage was three times the national average. In addition, three of the five largest landfills in the country, comprising 40 percent of
the nation's total estimated landfill capacity, were located in mostly Hispanic or African-American
communities."); Luke W. Cole and Sheila R. Foster, FROM THE GROUND Up - ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM AND THE RISE OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE MOVEMENT

167-183 (2001).
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cial Responsibility and Management Assistance Authority (FRMAA), and its
power to enact legislation on behalf of the District of Columbia without interfering with federalism. Next, I will briefly explain impediments to Congressional
assistance, especially given the current government in power, and then move into
reasons why the District should have control over the implementation and enforcement of solid waste permit regulations. I will explain why the District does
not have a discriminatory purpose in reducing or eliminating out-of-state waste
entering its borders or in implementing its solid waste "tipping fee," and why the
District should be exempt, as a market participant, from the general rule that
states cannot prohibit the transfer of out-of-state waste into its borders. Finally, I
will conclude with the argument that more stringent regulations are needed in the
District, and give proposals for how that can be done through tighter restrictions
on the amount of waste moving through the D.C. and by holding waste management companies accountable for non-compliance with zoning and environmental
regulations and nuisance laws.
I.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Until 1993, the District government was responsible for disposal of all its solid
waste, and did so at the Fort Totten 16 and Benning Road1 7 Municipal Waste
Transfer Stations.18 However, as the two facilities became less able to accommodate D.C.'s growing waste and collapsed with a lack of funding, D.C. was forced
to allow private waste management companies to compete. However, private
haulers were forced to haul directly to the Lorton, Virginia, landfill, which significantly increased their costs. 19 Thus, the District then allowed private haulers to
open their own transfer stations within the District.20 In deciding where these
stations were allowed to operate, the Board of Zoning Adjustment (BZA) decided in 1992, in Zoning Case 91-17, that CM 21 and M2 2 districts were authorized
16 Fort Totten, 4900 Bates Road, NE, Washington, D.C.
17 Benning Road, 3200 Benning Road, NE, Washington, D.C.
18 Myles Glasgow, Address at Citizens' Summit Trash Transfer Issues, Washington, D.C. (Feb.
24, 2001).
19 See supra note 7, at 2.
20 According to the Solid Waste Transfer Facility Site Selection Advisory Panel, the factors that
contributed to the demand for privately run transfer stations are dilapidated municipal facilities, the
decision made by the Supreme Court in C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383 (1994)
(holding that states cannot prevent the importation of out-of-state waste because it would violate the
commerce clause) and the increase of landfill costs due to stronger environmental standards set by the
Environmental Protection Agency under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act. SOLID
WASTE TRANSFER FACILITY SELECTION ADVISORY PANEL, DRAFT REPORT 2-3 (2000).
21 A "C-M" District is zoned for heavy commercial and light industrial uses. NAT'L CAPITAL
PLANNING COMM'N, PROPOSED AMENDMENTS To THE ZONING REGULATIONS OF THE DISTRICT OF
COLUMBIA - SOLID WASTE HANDLING FACILITIES IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA,

Z.C. 96-5, at 4 (1998).
22 An "M" District is zoned for heavy industrial uses. Id.

NCPC File No.
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places where garbage and trash transfer station activity could occur as a matter of
right. 23 The D.C. Court of Appeals upheld this interpretation. 24 Needless to say,

these decisions were a catalyst for waste management companies to set up transfer stations. However, CM districts are defined as those areas which allow for
"light processing," which was defined as any industrial processing involving the
sorting, bailing and shipping of inorganic recyclables as well as disposal of a residue that was the kind of processing which was entitled as a matter of right in
D.C.'s CM districts. 25 It is questionable whether such activity should be considered "light processing." As the alarmed D.C. community, especially neighborhoods in the northeast, raised concerns with the District's government, the
Department of Consumer and Regulatory Affairs (DCRA), Office of Planning
and the Department of Public Works (DPW) promised licensing regulations that
never happened; there was a regulatory vacuum from 1991 - 1995.26

As a result of the District's decisions made in the 1990's, D.C. now has 74
licensed haulers who operate 364 trucks to collect trash from' apartments and
businesses, 27 but the waste management facilities were virtually unregulated.28
Small waste trucks, which are necessary to move through D.C.'s narrow roads,
carry small loads of trash to transfer stations in the District. There, the trash is
compacted and transferred to large hauling trucks that ultimately dump the trash
29
in Virginia or Maryland landfills.
Following the allowance of private haulers, the District quickly passed several
pieces of emergency legislation relating to solid waste disposal in 1994 and 1995,
including the Recycling Fee and Illegal Dumping Emergency Enforcement Act of
1994,30 the Solid Waste Facility Permit Emergency Act of 1994,31 and the Solid
Waste Facility Permit Temporary Act of 1994.32 The Temporary Act of 1994 re23
tions 3,
24
25
26
27

Myles Glasgow, Suggestions on What to Do About D.C.'s Garbage and Trash Transfer Staavailable at http://www.ilsr.org/recycling/historic.html (last modified Mar. 1998).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Important Facts About Solid Waste Transfer in the District, CITIZENS' SUMMIT ON TRASH
TRANSFER ISSUES (Solid Waste Transfer Facility Site Selection Advisory Panel, Washington, D.C.),
Feb. 24, 2001, at 10-11.
28 See supra note 21 ("Neither the Zoning Commission, the Office of Planning or the DPW
(Department of Public Works) have done anything in the past to obtain professional reports on what
design criteria should govern a state of the art garbage and trash transfer station in D.C. The companies in that industry have not produced such a report. The guiding principle has been don't do it
properly if no one knows the difference.").
29 Myles Glasgow, Address at Citizens' Summit on Trash Transfer Issues, Washington, D.C.
(Feb. 24, 2001).
30 Recycling Fee & Illegal Dumping Amendment Act of 1995, 1995 D.C. Stat. 11-12.
31 Solid Waste Facility Permit Emergency Act of 1994, 1994 D.C. Stat. 10-284, 42 D.C. Reg. 45
(1994).
32 Solid Waste Facility Permit Temporary Act of 1994, 1995 D.C. Stat. 10-251. (codified as
amended at D.C. CODE ANN. § 8-1060 (West Supp. 2001)).
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quired private solid waste facilities to obtain a solid waste facility permit, to pay a
non-refundable $15,000 permit application fee, and pay a $10 per ton annual capacity tax.3 3 The Act also "authorizes the Mayor to order immediate closure of
any private transfer facility which the Mayor deems to be in violation of the in' 3"
terim permit or any health, safety, environmental or zoning law or regulation.
In 1995, the District enacted the Solid Waste Act of 1995; 35 which requires a $4
tipping fee 3 6 per ton of waste transferred to any private waste facilities in the
District. The Act of 1995 was amended in 1998 and again in 1999. 37 The Permit
Amendment Act of 1998 was created to "protect residential communities and
commercial districts within the District of Columbia from the harmful effects of
solid waste facilities, by requiring stricter standards of operation for solid waste
facilities."'38 Former Mayor Marion Barry vetoed the legislation, believing that
two of the sections violated the principles of due process 39 and the Home Rule
Act, n° respectively." 1 Mayor Barry vetoed Section 11(d) of Bill 12-582 because it
requires a facility to close upon a finding that the facility was in noncompliance
with the Permit Act. Barry stated that suspension of a business license prior to 42a
hearing is permitted only where there is a need for prompt government action.
Barry requested the D.C. Council to add that a business license would be immeis endangerment to human health and public weldiately suspended only if there
43
environment.
the
fare and
Mayor Barry likewise rejected Section 11(g) of the same act because it set
forth court procedures to be followed if the Corporation Counsel petitions for
issuance of a contempt order against a solid waste facility for violation of the
Permit Act. Barry explained that these court procedures fall within the rulemaking authority conferred upon District of Columbia courts by D.C. Code §1133 Id.
34 Id. at § 8-1060 (2)(d)(1) (" If the Mayor determines, after investigation, that the conduct of a
solid waste facility present an imminent danger to the health or safety of the residents of the District,
the Mayor shall close and seal the facility.").
35 D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 8-1051-1063 (West Supp. 2001).
36 "Tipping fees" are those fees paid to the District for the privilege of disposing the trash in the
District. D.C. CODE ANN. § 8-1057(b)(1) (West Supp. 2001).
37 Solid Waste Facility Permit Second Emergency Amendment Act of 1998, 1999 D.C. Stat. 12623, 42 D.C. Reg. 1364 (1999); Solid Waste Facility Amendment Act of 1998, 1999 D.C. Stat. 12-286;
Solid Waste Facility Permit Amendment Act of 1999, D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 8-1051-1063 (West Supp.
2001).
38 COMMITTEE ON CONSUMER AND REGULATORY AFFAIRS, REPORT OF BILL 13-30, SOLID
WASTE FACILITY PERMIT AMENDMENT ACT OF 1999, at 2 (1999) (prepared by Sharon Ambrose).

39
40
41
Council
42
43

U.S. CONST. amend V.
D.C. CODE ANN. tit. 10 § 233(a)(4) (1995).
Letter from Marion Barry, Jr., Former Mayor of D.C. to Linda Cropp, Chairman of D.C.
1 (Dec. 24, 1998).
Id.
Id.
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946. Thus, he believed such a Council enactment is prohibited by Section 602(4)
of the Home Rule Act (D.C. Code § 1-233(4)). 44 Nevertheless, the D.C. Council
overrode the Mayor's veto and enacted the 1998 emergency and temporary
amendment in 1999.45 The permanent legislation, entitled the "Solid Waste Facility Permit Amendment Act of 1999," took into consideration Mayor Barry's concerns and was enacted to amend the Act of 1998 "to require a compliance
hearing prior to the closing of a solid waste facility and to allow a summary closing, with the opportunity for a post-closing hearing, where the facility poses an
immediate threat to public health, safety and welfare to citizens and the environ46
ment, and to clarify that the rules of the court govern in cases of contempt.,
The creation of legislation led inevitably to litigation battles with the private
waste management companies that were now required to comply with these permit rules before they could operate in the District. Two important cases were
reviewed by the Court of Appeals after the Superior Court enjoined the District
from enforcing its regulations.4 7 The D.C. Court of Appeals has not been overly
supportive of either case. The Court determined that L.G. Industries, which argued it had a valid Certificate of Occupancy (CO), 48 was subject to the Board of
Zoning Adjustment's administrative review of that C.O.'s validity, and the other
issues in the case will not be determined until the administrative review has taken
place. The same court has likewise not been enforcement-friendly in the E. T W.
case. 4 9 Thus, resolution of these cases in favor of strict compliance of permit
regulations has not yet occurred.
The issues in E. T. W. included whether the court had jurisdiction over interlocutory appeals, whether the solid waste facility charge was a tax rather than a fee,
and whether this charge was constitutional.5 ° The Court addressed only the first
two issues, and remanded the case to the trial court for further factual development and determination of the facility charge's constitutionality. In July 1995,
Honorable Mitchell-Rankin of the D.C. Superior Court granted a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) against the District, enjoining D.C. from enforcing the
temporary version of the Permit Act and its emergency rule, along with the Ille44
45

Id. at 1-2.
COMMITTEE ON CONSUMER AND REGULATORY AFFAIRS, COMMITTEE REPORT ON BILL

30, SOLID WASTE FACILITY PERMIT AMENDMENT

AcT OF 1999 3 (1999)

13-

(prepared by Carol

Schwartz).
46 See D.C. CODE ANN. § 8-1060 (11)(d) and (g) (West. Supp. 2001).
47 District of Columbia v. L.G. Industries, Inc., 758 A.2d 950, 952 (2000) (L.G.I. was renamed
USA Waste of D.C. on Apr. 23, 1998); Eastern Trans-Waste, 758 A.2d 1.
48 D.C. CODE ANN. § 5-426 (1995) (defining Certificate of Occupancy as a certified statement
from the applicant that its facility is designed in a manner capable of complying with all applicable
D.C. laws). Requirements for a valid Certificate of Occupancy can be found in D.C. CODE ANN. § 63432.
49 Eastern Trans-Waste, 758 A.2d at 16.
50 Id. at 3-4.
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gal Dumping Enforcement Act. 5 ' The trial court concluded that the $4 per ton
fee "tipping fee" was unconstitutional, as applied under the Commerce clause of
the U.S Constitution, as to waste processed in the District for less than 24 hours,
which originates and is destined for disposal out of the District.5 2 Judge Eilperin
explained that because solid waste deposited at the E.T.W. facility is already in

interstate commerce, it is not subject to local taxation.5 3
The Court of Appeals foreshadowed its view on the issue of the constitutional-

ity of the facility charge when it stated, "While the court thinks that E.T.W. has

the better of the argument that the regulatory scheme unconstitutionally forces
the interstate commerce hauler to pay a double fee - namely the D.C. collection
fee and any surcharge imposed by the state in which it ultimately dumps - the
court is of the view that a fuller record would help explicate the regulatory
scheme so that the court could be surer of its views." 54 Judge Eilperin granted
the injunction because not doing so would threaten E.T.W.'s existence due to the
possible economic loss E.T.W. would incur.5 The Court of Appeals also stated
that in the balance of harms and public interest factor, "the Court is persuaded by
the trial court's view that the public interest is served by preventing impermissible burdens on interstate commerce which have the effect of stifling competition
in the recycling, waste management and transfer business. Thus, according to the

record, the Court finds no evidence that the injunction presents a danger to public health and safety and; likewise, there's no basis for disturbing the trial court's
assessment.", 56 The trial court was silent on the issue of whether the fee is constitutional on waste that originates in D.C. because it felt the issue was not ripe for
discussion.5 7

The Temporary Restraining Order was modified and extended in September
1996,58 and the District requested an interlocutory appeal, 59 arguing the solid
waste facility charge of $4 per ton6" does not violate the Commerce Clause and
that the trial court erred in enjoining the District from enforcing its zoning laws
against E.T.W.6 1 Eastern Trans-Waste argued that, in addition to violating the
Commerce clause, the solid waste facility charge and collection62fee violates the
Due Process and Equal Protection clauses of the Constitution.
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62

Id. at 5.
Id. at 7.
Id. at 16.
Id. at 17-18.
Id. at 15.
Id. at 46.
Id. at 7.
Id. at 6.
Id. at 4.
D.C. CODE ANN. § 8-1057(b)(1).
Eastern Trans-Waste, 758 A.2d at 4.
Id. at 5.
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The E.T.W. Court sets forth the analysis that the trial court must use to determine the constitutionality of the solid waste facility charge based on the principles of the Commerce Clause and the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine. In
cases involving taxes on interstate activities, the Court presents the framework
the Supreme Court set forth in Complete Transit Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274
(1977).63 However, the E.T.W. Court does not actually apply the framework to

the current situation, but rather concludes that "applying these approaches require further factual development which isn't available to the court." The Court
agreed with the trial court that there is a substantial likelihood of success on the
merits for purposes of injunctive relief. Thus, did not grant the District's interlocutory appeal. 64 Thus, the District is currently enjoined from enforcing the tipping
fee requirement of the Permit Act against Eastern Trans-Waste.
Nevertheless, there is hope for the District: "The court is unable to say, without more factual development, that under no circumstances could the Government ultimately prevail. ' 65 The Court points out that D.C.'s zoning laws, which
66
are not discussed in the case, are not an issue and, therefore, are enforceable.
Given the Court's current holdings, enforcement of D.C.'s regulations are enjoined due to their alleged violation of the U.S. Constitution's Commerce Clause.
Meanwhile, a Solid Waste Transfer Facility Selection Advisory Panel was established in 1999 to analyze D.C.'s growing dilemma. Through analysis of the
District's trash transfer stations and current laws, the Panel found that D.C. has
67
no suitable sites for transfer stations that meet the criteria identified in the law.
D.C. law, which allows three years for waste management facilities to come into
compliance with a 50-foot set back of actual facility from the property line and
500-foot buffer requirements from any residential property or park, become effective in 2002.68 As of 2001, none of the present transfer stations conform with
this law.6 9 Given the urgency to solve D.C.'s growing dilemma, D.C. must find a
way to deal with its trash transfer problem, without discriminating against interstate commerce, but still integrating important health, safety and environmental
interests of the community. This paper will offer possible ways this can be accomplished through the integration of legal analysis and the philosophies of
environmentalism.

63
64

Id. at 43-44.
Id. at 45.

65

Eastern Trans-Waste, 758 A.2d at 30.

66
67
68
69

Id. at 47.
SOLID WASTE TRANSFER FACILITY SELECTION ADVISORY PANEL, DRAFT REPORT 11 (2000).

See D.C. CODE ANN. § 8-1058 (West Supp. 2001).
Did You Know?, CITIZENS' SUMMIT ON TRASH TRANSFER ISSUES (Solid Waste Transfer Fa-

cility Site Selection Advisory Panel, Washington, D.C.), Feb. 24, 2001, at 11.
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II.

CONGRESSIONAL ASSISTANCE

Congress has the power to enact legislation that the D.C. Council does not
have the authority to do on its own because of the District of Columbia's historical development. On December 19, 1791, Maryland ratified an act for cession
from the area now known as Washington, D.C., and relinquished the land and full
jurisdiction to Congress. 70 In December of 1800, the District became the government seat, and in Congress's Organic Act of 1801, Congress assumed exclusive
jurisdiction over the District. 7 1 As a result, the federal government must work
together with the D.C. Council to find workable solutions to the District's mounting trash problem. Congress can authorize many legislative solutions: one option
is to prohibit the transfer of out-of-state waste altogether in the District. 72 Another solution is to authorize the D.C. Council to create these types of trade
barriers rather than Congress.73 A third option is to enact legislation identical or
similar to the Solid Waste Permit Act.74 Regardless of the type of regulation enacted, none of the above-mentioned options would be unconstitutional, as described below, because of Congress's express and implied constitutional powers.
A.

Commerce Clause

Congress has plenary power under Article I, section 8, clause 3 of the U.S.
Constitution 75 to consent to local flow control. 76 This Congressional power deserves some explanation and historical background. The principal purpose of the
Commerce Clause was to prevent individual states from enacting trade barriers
to interstate and foreign trade. 77 The cases which laid the foundation for interpretation of the Commerce Clause begin with McCulloch v. Maryland,78 which
vested Congress with plenary authority, and continued on with Gibbons v.
Ogden,79 which explained that Congress's power under the Commerce Clause is
plenary, that the only activities beyond Congress's regulation are those activities
completely within a state and which do not affect other states. 80 The Supreme
Court has interpreted the clause as granting Congress the authority to positively
70 Adams v. Clinton, 90 F. Supp. 2d 35, 57 (2000).
71 Id. at 56.
72 U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
73 U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 17 and U.S. CONST., art. VI, cl. 2.
74 U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 17 and U.S. CONST., art. VI, cl. 2.
75 U.S. Const., art. I, § 8, cl. 3 ("[The Congress shall have the power] To regulate commerce
with foreign nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian tribes").
76 "Flow control" is regulation of trash coming into and out of an area.
77 MAY, supra note 76, at 175. See THE FEDERALIST No. 11, at 53-54 (Alexander Hamilton),
and THE FEDERALIST No. 42, at 214-15 (James Madison).

78 Mc Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819) (holding that Congress is vested with plenary
authority under the Commerce Clause).
79 Ogden, 22 U.S. at 1.
80 Id. at 236-37.
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exercise the agenda of Congress. This was an economic agenda that surpasses a
vision of a free market system between states.8 1
The Supreme Court's interpretation of Congress's power through the Commerce Clause evolved over time. The prevailing rule used to be that when there
is a need for a uniform national rule, the power to regulate belongs exclusively to
the federal government. 82 But if the activity is one that does not demand a uniform rule, the states are free to regulate the area until Congress chooses to do
so.

83

This holding was later abandoned in favor of the view that concurrent power
was not allowed, that the federal government had control over certain issues and
states had power over other issues, none of which were concurrent. For example,
in United States v. E.C. Knight Co., the Supreme Court held that power over

interstate commerce could not extend into manufacturing of sugar because this
was a local activity, regularly reserved to the states.84 This view changed once
again in United States v. Darby,8 5 to what is the modern interpretation of the
Commerce Clause: the "substantial effects" test. 86 Congress may regulate interitself, as well as any activity that substantially affects interstate
state commerce
87
commerce.
There are two modern doctrines under the Commerce clause, pursuant to a
state law, which can be considered invalid: the preemption doctrine, where a state
regulation violates the Supremacy clause of the U.S. Constitution by interfering
with national regulations, or under the dormant Commerce clause doctrine,
where state laws unduly burden interstate commerce. 88 Here, the transfer of
waste into and out of the District necessarily involves interstate commerce but
would not violate the Supremacy clause because the District is governed by federal regulation, not state law. The Necessary and Proper clause 89 allows the federal government to do what is reasonably necessary to carry out the enumerated
powers. 90 thus, Congress can consent to the prohibition of out-of-state waste
transfer in the District or a $4 tipping fee on the same waste if it is reasonably
related to the regulation of interstate commerce.
81 MAY, supra note 76, at 175.
82 Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. 299 (1851).
83 Id. at 301.
84 United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895).
85 United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
86 MAY, supra note 76, at 182.
87 See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (holding that when economic activity substantially effects interstate commerce, legislation regulating that activity will be sustained).
88
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89

749 (2d ed. 1998).
U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, c1.18.

90

Mc Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819).
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"Dormant" commerce clause means there is an area of the commerce clause in
which Congress has not made active use of its power. 9 1 The history of this dormant or negative power is unclear, but it has evolved over time. The dormant
Commerce clause is only concerned with discrimination against interstate or foreign community. 92 If the issue of whether the dormant Commerce Clause has
been violated by a state arises, there are five inquiries that need to be made: (1)
Is the law rationally related to a legitimate state purpose; 93 (2) does the law have

the practical effect of regulating out-of-state transactions; (3) if the law discriminates against interstate or foreign commerce, does it represent the least discriminatory means for the state to achieve its purpose; 94 (4) are the burdens the law
places on interest or foreign commerce clearly excessive in relation to the benefits which the law affords the state; 95 and (5) does the law represent the least

burdensome means for the state to achieve its goal? 96 If a state law would otherwise violate the dormant Commerce Clause because it fails to meet one of the
five requirements, the state may be able to show that its conduct is excused, either because the action was authorized by Congress or because the state was

acting as a market participant, 97 both of which are options discussed within this
paper.
The Commerce Clause allows Congress to authorize a trade barrier even
though a state itself cannot do so unilaterally. 98 It is constitutional for states to

adopt regulations or join multi-state compacts that are consistent with federal
guidelines. In fact, according to the E.P.A., 39 states and the District of Columbia have enacted flow control laws or have the power to do so through home
rule. 99 Thus, in New York v. United States,100 the Supreme Court held that a state
could impose a discriminatory tax or regulation use to take other state's waste if
91 MAY, supra note 76, at 296.
92 Id.
93 See Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456 (1981) (holding extraordinary
deference is accorded to states in applying the rational relationship requirement). CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW: NATIONAL POWER AND FEDERALISM, EXAMPLES AND EXPLANATIONS 293 (Christopher N. May

et al. eds., 1998) (concluding that once a legitimate purpose is identified, it is highly improbable that
the measure will be struck down on the basis that it is not reasonably adapted to that end).
94 C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383 (1994) (holding state laws will be invalidated if the state has less discriminatory ways to accomplish its purpose).
95 MAY, supra note 76, at 285 (A law will be deemed to be economic protectionist if it was
enacted because of the fact that it will shield locals from the effects of out-of-state competition.) See
also South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82 (1984).
96 MAY, supra note 76, at 288.
97 Id. at 306.
98 New York v. United States, 505 U.S.144 (1992).
99 James E. McCarthy, Environment and Natural Resources Policy Division, CongressionalResearch Service Issue Brief for Congress 97006: Solid Waste Issues in the 105th Congress, available at
http://www.cnie.org/nle/waste-16.htm# 1_4. (last modified Dec. 23, 1998).
100 New York, 505 U.S. 144.
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those states are not in compliance with that state's regulations. 10 1 Under this
theory, Congress can impose the $4 tipping fee without violating the Commerce
Clause of the United States Constitution.
B.

District Clause

Congress also has sole power to exercise exclusive legislation over the District
of Columbia. 10 2 The District Clause reads, "To exercise exclusive Legislation in
all cases whatsoever, over such District (not exceeding ten Miles square) as may,
by Cession of particular States, and the Acceptance of Congress, become the Seat
of the Government of the United States.... ,"o However, through the Home
Rule Act 10 4 Congress relinquished some authority to the D.C. Council.10 5 Laws
enacted by the Council are subject to Congressional oversight 10 6 and, "subject to
the retention by Congress of the ultimate legislative authority over the Nation's
capital granted by Art. I § 8 of the Constitution., 10 7 Thus, Congress has the ability to consent to legislation, or create its own legislation, concerning the tipping
fees or the outright prohibition of out-of-state waste flow into the District.
Even though D.C. is not a state, the D.C. Council is subject to the same constitutional constraints as are those of the states, but is additionally subject to Congressional oversight.10 8 The D.C. Council is treated as a state in certain respects:
"specifically, acts passed by the D.C. Council are subject to analysis under the
federal preemption doctrine and the Commerce Clause." 10 9 The D.C. Code applies to claims in the District if the claims have a sufficient nexus to D.C., but are
not so interstate in nature to offend the Commerce Clause. 110
C.

FinancialResponsibility and Management Assistance Authority

Congress is also able to extend its authority over the District by other means:
through the Financial Responsibility and Management Assistance Authority
(FRMAA). Shook v. Districtof Columbia FinancialResponsibility and ManageNew York, 505 U.S. at 149 (1992).
U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl.17.
103 U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl.17.
104 The Home Rule Act is officially called the District of Columbia Self Government and Government Reorganization Act of 1973, Pub. L. 93-198 (1973)], D.C. CODE Arm. § 1-206-233 (1981).
105 Sun Dun, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co., 740 F. Supp. 381, 394 (D. Md. 1990).
106 D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-206.
107 Sun Dun, 740 F. Supp. at 394-95 (quoting D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-201(a) (1981)).
108 Sun Dun, 740 F. Supp. at 395.
109 See Don't Tear It Down, Inc. v. Pennsylvania Ave. Dev. Corp., 642 F.2d 527, n.2 (D.C. Cir.
1980) and Quality Brands, Inc. v. Barry, 715 F. Supp. 1138, 1139 (D.D.C. 1989) (holding that "a
conventional Commerce Clause analysis does apply to laws passed by the D.C. government").
110 Sun Dun, 740 F. Supp. at 398.
101
102
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ment Assistance Authority1 11 explains D.C.'s recent history of control. In 1995,
when D.C. was plagued by financial crisis, the Financial Responsibility and Management Assistance Act of 1995 established a Control Board, the District of Columbia Financial Responsibility and Management Assistance Authority
(FRMAA), appointed by the President of the United States. The Board was established with a wide range of powers to improve D.C.'s government operations.
The Act was later amended (Section 207(d)) to strengthen the Control Board,
giving the Board the ability to issue orders, rules or regulations considered appropriate to carry out the purpose of the act to the extent its within the authority of
the Mayor or head of any department in the D.C. government. The Shook Court
held, "The Control Board, after consultation with Congress, may implement any
of its own recommendations to ensure compliance with the District's financial
plan or to improve the delivery of public services over the objection of the Council."' " 2 In fact, Senator Cohen, who at the time of the passage of the act was the
Chairman of the Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management and
the District of Columbia, viewed section 207 as granting the Control Board the
13
authority to enact local legislation if the Council rejected its recommendations."
Thus, the FRMAA appears to have the authority to legislate for the District and
could possibly enact legislation regarding caps on the amount of waste or the type
of waste allowed into the District.
According to the D.C. District Court in Chavous v. FinancialResponsibility
and Management Assistance Authority, 1 1 4 the history of the FRMAA shows the
"Congressional intent to create a governmental composite of legislative, executive and administrative powers that were co-extensive with those of the Mayor
and Council while simultaneously attempting to preserve home rule."' 11 5 The
Plaintiffs in Chavous, including Councilmen Kevin Chavous and David Catania,
argued that the Control Board's authority violated the separation of powers because the Board members are authorized and appointed by the President in the
executive branch, but have a legislative function. 1 16 However, the District Court
rejected this: "Congress is the ultimate legislative authority for the District. As it
carries out its lawmaking powers, Congress has the right to devise the mechanism
by which its authority will be exercised and the Control Board is simply the most
recent of these mechanisms.' 1 7 The Court continues, "No authority cited which
111 Shook v. District of Columbia Financial Responsibility and Management Assistance Authority, 132 F.3d 775 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
112 Shook, 132 F.3d at 779 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
113 Chavous v. Financial Responsibility and Management Assistance Authority, 154 F. Supp. 2d
40 (2001).
114 Id.
115 Id.
116 Id.
117 Id.
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support the notion that merely because Control Board members are appointed through Congressional design - by the President, that this action by the Control
Board constitutes an enroachment by one co-equal branch of the national government into the powers of another. Since the Control Board's power to act
devolves from, and cannot exceed, Congress's own power to act, it is legislative
power rather than executive power that has affected the Council's own authority
here." 11 8

Although the Control Board was given a sunset provision of February 1, 2001,
it appears that Congress, through FRMAA § 221, can determine that a new control period is necessary if the District is not able to meet its borrowing needs and
cannot keep a balanced budget. 119 Thus, the FRMAA is another possible means
in which Congress could delegate legislative powers on this issue.
D.

Federalism

Congress's ability to enact legislation concerning trash transfer stations under
these constitutional powers could raise the question of whether Congress would
be overstepping the bounds of federalism; 120 however, consenting to flow control
through creation of a federal statute or empowering the D.C. Council to create a
flow control statute does not conflict with the values of federalism.
Federalism is the cooperation and cohabitation of both state and federal
power, 121 which is exactly what D.C. needs in regards to this issue: cooperation of
the federal government to further the District's interests. Although the federal
government may not push states to enact or administer federal statutes, 122 in this
instance D.C. would welcome Congress's assistance in creation or enforcement of
regulations controlling waste management.
If Congress were to create trade barriers on behalf of D.C. under its Commerce Clause power, the Supreme Court would most likely validate that legislation under its theory of judicial restraint. 123 The Supreme Court is exceedingly
reluctant to overrule majoritarian decisions of other branches of government,
branches that have been elected by the people. 124 Thus, the Supreme Court will
not invalidate Congress's regulations unless they are designed for the accomplishment of objectives not given to the Congress. In review of a regulation, the Su118 Id.
119 Id.
120 See generally FEDERALIST PAPER No. 47 (James Madison) (defining Federalism is the division of governmental power between various states and holds to the belief that as many decisions as
possible should be decided locally).
121 See generally FEDERALIST PAPER, No. 47 (James Madison) (excerpts in DANIEL A. FARBER
ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW app. at 24 (1998).

122
123
124

U.S. CONST., amend. X (empowering the states to retain residuary sovereignty).
See generally DANIEL A. FARBER ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 85-86 (2d ed. 1998).
Id.
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preme Court asks whether Congress had constitutional authority to legislate over
this issue. In accordance with both the District Clause1 25 and the Commerce
Clause, Congress does have constitutional authority to legislate trash transfer stations. The Supreme Court then asks whether the statute violates some affirmative power that is an express constitutional provision, such as the Bill of Rights.
Although Virginia and Maryland may argue that such a statute prohibiting the
transfer of out-of-state waste to D.C. facilities violates their right of state sovereignty and immunity, Congress has the power to regulate interstate commerce
and create trade barriers if it sees fit.' 26 The Supreme Court explained in C & A
Carbone, Inc. v. Clarkstown,127 that it is within Congress's power to authorize
local imposition of flow control if there is a clear indication that Congress intends
states and localities to implement flow control.' 28 Thus, the Commerce Clause
allows Congress to erect trade barriers between D.C. and other local jurisdictions
concerning the transfer of its trash to the District if Congress clearly intends that
result. 129 D.C. should be considered an exception to the majority opinion that
states cannot impede the flow of trash from one state to another, 130 because it is
not a state. The District has very limited space and natural resources in its ten
square miles and should not be required to accommodate waste beyond its borders when it cannot do so in an environmentally-safe manner.
E. Impediments to CongressionalAssistance

The Bush administration's policy of limited federal intervention in environmental issues, along with the Supreme Court's apparent trend of limited federal
intervention in state rights, might affect Congress's ability to empower D.C. to
grapple with its trash problem.
The Clinton administration advocated a strong federal role in the environment; however the new administration has a contrasting policy objective of generally limiting federal regulation,1 3 1 which could mean it will be an uphill battle
for D.C. to involve Congress in this controversial issue. The Supreme Court, like125 U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 17.
126 U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 17 and U.S. CONST., art. VI, cl. 2.
127 C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 583 (1994).
128 Carbone, 114 S. Ct. at 1691 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
129 The standard set forth in Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460 (1991), requires Congress
to clearly and plainly put its intent on the face of an act, or the act will be considered unconstitutional.
See also McCarthy, supra note 100 (stating that Congress can authorize use of flow control under its
Commerce Clause authority).
130 See Carbone, at 511 U.S. 383 (1994) (holding that states cannot attach restrictions to exports
or imports flowing through their state) and Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 626-27 (1978)
(holding that states may not discriminate against articles of commerce unless there is some reason,
apart from their origin, to treat them differently).
131 Lawrence R. Liebsman and Rabe Petersen, For the Birds, LEGAL TIMES, Feb. 2001, at 67.
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wise, has not been overly supportive of environmental law initiatives. Richard
Lazarus provides poignant criticism of the Court's analysis:
The Courts analysis of facially discriminatory laws is wholly unforgiving. To
sustain any facial discrimination against interstate products (including waste or
services), the state government must proffer "some reason, apart from their origin, to treat them differently." The Court's rulings, however, provide yet another
classic instance in which the Justices' failure to appreciate the special character of
ecological injuries undermine the Court's legal analysis. The Court irrefutably
presumes the illegitimacy of any consideration of the outsider status of the prod13 2
ucts or services at issue.
Recent Supreme Court cases involved intrastate commerce that Congress attempted to regulate. The narrow view of these cases is that the Commerce
Clause power should not be used to shift traditional state law power to federal
power.1 33 In January 2001, the Supreme Court continued this trend when it overturned the Seventh Circuit in Solid Waste Agency v. United States Army Corps of
Engineers,134 holding that the state has traditional and primary power over land
and water use. Thus the Army Corps was not allowed to deny Illinois the right to
dredge ponds for the purpose of creating landfills. 135 Although this decision was
based on narrow statutory grounds rather than the pertinent constitutional issue
of interstate commerce,1 36 the decision should "allow the new administration to
assert that the federal government cannot use its environmental regulations to
usurp state and local environmental and land use controls, at least not without
clear direction from Congress. ' 137 Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion in Solid
Waste moved away from the environmental protection he so strongly advocated
in the dissent of Oregon Waste Systems, Inc. v. Department of Environmental
Quality138 only a few years ago. Thus, under this current Court's vision, D.C. has
only a slim hope that Congress will assist in creating legislative trade barriers.
Still, it is a legal option for which activists should lobby.
III.

DISTRICT CONTROL

A.

Injunction Removal

If Congress refuses to create legislation pertaining to this issue under the philosophy of limited federal intervention in state rights, then the District of Colum132 Richard J. Lazarus, Restoring What's EnvironmentalAbout Environmental Law, 47 UCLA
L. REV. 703, 756 (2000).
133 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) and United States v. Morrison, 531 U.S. (2000).
134 Solid Waste Agency v. United States Army Corps of Engineers, 121 S. Ct. 675 (2001).
135 Solid Waste.
136 Id.
137 Lawrence R. Liebesman and Rafe Petersen, For the Birds, LEGAL TIMES, Feb. 2001, at 66.
138 Oregon Waste Systems, Inc. v. Department of Environmental Quality, 511 U.S. 98, 1355
(1994) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
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bia should be allowed to enforce its own legislation. Unlike the Supreme Court,
the D.C. Court of Appeals has declined to defer to the Council of the District of
Columbia, which is equivalent to a state's legislature. The D.C. Court of Appeals
should lift the injunction against the District's ability to enforce the $4 tipping fee
in its own regulations because the Solid Waste Permit Act's provision is not, as
explained herein, unconstitutional.
B.

Discrimination

The constitutionality of a state regulation depends on a sensitive consideration
of the weight and nature of the state regulatory concern in light of the extent of
burden imposed on the course of interstate commerce. 139 State law is invalid
under the dormant Commerce Clause if its burdens on interstate or foreign com140 In
merce heavily outweigh whatever benefits the measure affords the state.
balancing, there might be a need to take into account the existence of other legislation.14 1 The courts should take into consideration the D.C. Council's efforts
towards regulating solid waste disposal.
A recent appellate case in the Fourth Circuit, Waste Management Holdings,
Inc. v. Gilmore,142 addressed the issue of whether its statutory provisions would
discriminate against municipal solid waste (MSW) generated outside of Virginia
in their practical effect, or were enacted for the purpose of discriminating against
MSW generated waste outside of Virginia. 143 This case is similar to D.C.'s situation, but D.C.'s factual circumstances do differ in important respects. Virginia
landfills rely heavily on out-of-state waste to pay maintenance costs. Waste Management Holdings, Inc. is the primary contender for a 20-year contract to dispose
of 12,000 tons of residential waste per day from the New York City area. 144 In
July, 1998, Virginia Senator Bill Bolling wrote to the Attorney General requesting that this plan be blocked. Governor Gilmore, meanwhile, put a moratorium
on landfill development. 145 In March and April of 1999, five statutory provisions
relating to capping the amount of waste that could be accepted for dumping in
Virginia and regulating the means of transporting that waste to Virginia was approved and put into law. 1 4 6 Thus began the history of this current case.
139 Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 668 (1981).
140 MAY, supra note 76, at 301. See also Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945)
(concluding the Supreme Court concluded that burdens of prohibiting trains to move through the
state if they did not meet a certain length outweighed the state's benefit in its claim of increased
safety).
141 MAY, supra note 76, at 302.
142 Waste Management Holdings, Inc. v. Gilmore, 252 F.3d 316 (4th Cir. 2001).
143 Id. at 334.
144 Waste Management Holdings, Inc. v. Gilmore, 252 F.3d 316, 326 (4th Cir. 2001).
145 Id. at 325-36.
146 Id. at 327.
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Several Virginia landfill operators brought an action against the Virginia governor and related officials in their professional capacity arguing that these provisions violate the dormant Commerce Clause, Contracts Clause and Equal
Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution.14 7 On June 30, 1999, a preliminary
injunction was instituted by the Eastern District Court to prevent enforcement of
the cap provisions. 148 On August 24, 1999, the District Court struck down motions by Virginia asserting the affirmative defense that New York City had taken
steps to discourage disposal in New York. 14 9 On February 2, 2000, the Court
granted the Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on the dormant Commerce
Clause issue; however, no summary judgment was granted on the issue of the cap
provision.'1 5 The Fourth Circuit found that Virginia did have a discriminatory
purpose, evidenced by the historical background of the statutory provisions,
statements showing an intent to block the plan, a consistent pattern of actions by
decision-making body impacting a particular group, events leading up to this
point, a departure from normal proceedings and contemporary statements from
decision-makers shown in meeting records. 15 1 The Court held that if Virginia
purposely discriminated, then the Court must strictly scrutinize their actions.1 52
The statute must impose the least burden possible on interstate commerce to be
considered valid.15 3
In the present case, the District of Columbia is not purposefully discriminating
against out-of-state waste because the $4 per ton fee is applied to all solid waste
facility operators, regardless of where the waste came from and who is doing the
dumping. Likewise it is the least burdensome alternative, by treating both intrastate and interstate waste alike.
The Supreme Court explained in Oregon Waste Systems that for a surcharge to
be justified as a compensatory tax necessary to make shippers of out-of-state
waste pay their fair share, it must be roughly equivalent to an identifiable and
substantially similar surcharge on intrastate commerce. 154 In the same year the
Supreme Court held in C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Clarkstown, 5 5 that a tax is discriminatory without regard to the underlying purposes when it entails differential
treatment of in-state and out-of-state economic interests that benefits the former
and burdens the latter. 156 Here, the $4 per ton fee is subject to any waste that is
transferred to a private waste management facility in the District, regardless of its
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156

Id. at 324.
Waste Management Holdings, Inc. v. Gilmore, 64 F. Supp. 2d 523 (E.D. Va. 1999).
Gilmore, 252 F.3d at 328.
Waste Management Holdings III, 87 F.Supp. 2d 536, 545 (E.D. Va. 2000).
Gilmore, 252 F.3d at 336.
Id. at 334.
Id. at 343.
Oregon Waste Systems, Inc. v. Department of Environmental Quality 511 U.S. 97 (1994).
C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383 (1994).
Id.
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origin. The statute does not differentiate between the transfer of out-of-state
waste versus in-state generated waste. Thus, it is difficult to see how this is
discriminatory.
C.

State Tax

This fee meets the requirements of a state tax and, therefore, should be upheld. The issue in Districtof Columbia v. Eastern Trans-Waste157 was whether the
$4 surcharge is a tax158 or a fee.159 The District argued it was a tax, while E.T.W.
argued it was a fee. The Court of Appeals concluded that the $4 tipping fee is
actually a tax rather than a fee because income from the rule would benefit the
public.1 60 The D.C. Council "was concerned with the impact on the health and
safety of D.C. residents of illegal dumping of waste in open areas and the
proliferations of unregulated companies that handle or process waste in the District. '' 161 Given that conclusion, the Court mentioned the Supreme Court's state
tax test discussed in Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady,16 2 which holds that
state taxes on interstate activities will be upheld if the taxed activity has a substantial nexus with the taxing jurisdiction, if the tax is fairly apportioned, if the
taxing legislation does not discriminate against interstate commerce and if the
163
amount of tax is fairly related to services provided the taxing jurisdiction.
However, the D.C. Court of Appeals in E.T.W. refused to resolve the constituthis state tax is constitutional until the trial court has furtional issue of whether
1 64
proceedings.
ther
D. Police Power
The Courts should acknowledge that a state could favor its own citizens in
times of shortage. Although D.C. is not technically a state, it is treated as such
for purposes of interstate commerce, and thus, is entitled to the state right to
utilize its police power to protect its own citizens' health and safety. Rehnquist,
dissenting, explained in Oregon Waste, "The availability of environmentally
sound landfill space and the proper disposal of solid waste strike me as justifiable
safety or health rationales for the fee. As far back as the turn of the century, the
Court recognized that control over the collection and disposal of solid waste was
157
158
159
160
161
162
163
164

District of Columbia v. Eastern Trans-Waste, 758 A.2d 1 (2000).
Id. at 10 (explaining that a "tax" charge is for revenue-raising purposes).
Id. at 10 (explaining that a "fee" charge is for regulatory or punitive purposes).
Id. at 12.
Id. at 27.
Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977).
Id. at 276.
Id. at 18.
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a legitimate, nonarbitrary exercise of police power to promote health and
1 65
safety."'

Rehnquist was referring to California Reduction Co. v. Sanitary Reduction
Works,' 6 6 where the Court declared, "Moreover, in the absence of a contrary

view expressed by Congress, we are reluctant to condemn as unreasonable, measures taken by a State to conserve and preserve for its own citizens this vital
resource in times of severe shortage. Our reluctance stems from the 16 7 'confluence of [several] realities.'1 68 The Court continued, "First, a State's power to
regulate the use of water in times and places of shortage for the purpose of protecting the health of its citizens-and not simply the health of its economy-is at
the core of its police power. For Commerce Clause purposes, we have long recognized a difference between economic protectionism, on the one hand, and
health and safety regulation, on the other." 169 Thus, D.C. has legitimate police
power to promote the health and safety of its own citizens. The Supreme Court
declared in Sporhase v. Nebraska,170 "every intendment is to be made in favor of
the lawfulness of the exercise of municipal power making regulations to promote
the public health and safety, and that it is not the province of courts, except in
clear cases, to interfere with the exercise of the power reposed by law in municipal corporations for the protection of local rights and the health and welfare of
' 71
the people in the community."'
In the Fourth Circuit's analysis in Gilmore, the Court asked whether Virginia
could show factors unrelated to economic protectionism, such as health and
safety concerns. 172 The Plaintiffs argued that Virginia caps should only target the
municipal state waste (MSW) from states that have lesser health and safety standards regarding MSW than Virginia. 73 The Court granted Plaintiffs summary
judgment on this issue, concluding that in order to show that out-of-state waste
must be prohibited from entering Virginia, the state must show that waste generated outside of Virginia is more dangerous than that generated inside Virginia,
which Virginia failed to do.174 However, the Defendants did meet their burden
of showing that the movement of waste by barges through the waterways be165
166
167
168
169
(1905).
170
171
172

Oregon Waste Systems, Inc. v. Department of Environmental, 511 U.S. 93 (1994).
California Reduction Co. v. Sanitary Reduction Works, 199 U.S. 306 (1905).
Id. at 319.
Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518, 534 (1978).
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Virginia present serious and unique health and safety
tween New York City and
1 75
risks to Virginia citizens.
According to the Solid Waste Transfer Facility Site Selection Advisory Panel,
Virginia requires a 50-foot set back between the facility and the boundary of the
transfer station, and a 200-foot distance between the facility and a residential
home or park. Maryland law is less specific, simply stating that a facility must be
in conformance with the county's solid waste management plan. 176 If D.C. can
provide regulations that are more stringent and enforced than Virginia or Maryland, the D.C. courts might agree with the Fourth Circuit's analysis in Gilmore,
holding that waste generated outside the District is more dangerous than that
generated within it.
IV.

MARKET PARTICIPANT

Even if the D.C. Courts do not buy into the philosophy of environmentalism
or do not agree that the District of Columbia's regulations are an exercise of its
police powers, the Court should recognize that D.C.'s participation in the commerce market gives it the right to act without regard to the economic interests of
other states. Numerous cases support the proposition that if D.C. is acting as a
market participant, the dormant Commerce Clause places no limit on its activities.1 77 The Supreme Court declared in South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke,178 "Our cases make clear that if a state is acting as a market participant,
rather than as a market regulator, the dormant Commerce Clause places no limitations on its activities."1 79 Virginia made the argument in the District Court
case that the statutory provisions were not in violation of the dormant Commerce
Clause because Virginia was a market participant. However, the District Court
said, and the Circuit Court agreed, that Virginia was not acting as a private participant in waste disposal market but as a regulator of "the conduct of others in
that market as only a state can do."'1 80 Even though Virginia was not considered
a market participant because it only had private transfer stations, D.C. is different because the District has municipal transfer stations that are competing with
the private transfer stations.
175 Id. at 343-44.
176 SOLID WASTE TRANSFER FACILITY SITE SELECTION ADVISORY PANEL, DRAFT REPORT, at
3 (Oct. 16, 2000).
177 South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82 (1984); Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447
U.S. 429 (1980); White v. Massachusetts Council of Construction Workers, Inc., 420 U.S. 204 (1983).
178 South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82 (1984).
179 Id. at 93. See also Reeves, 447 U.S. at 436 (holding that a state can refuse to deal with
particular parties when participating in the market); White, 420 U.S. at 211 (holding that a state is
allowed influence a particular class of economic activity if it is a market participant).
180 Waste Management Holdings, Inc, v. Gilmore (II), 64 F. Supp.2d at 544.
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The Supreme Court has gone so far as to recognize that a state can favor its
own citizens. In Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp.,' 8 1 the Court rejected a Commerce Clause attack on a Maryland program aimed at reducing the number of
junked automobiles in the state. The Court held that the Maryland action was
not "the kind of action which the Commerce Clause is concerned,' 8 2 because
"nothing in the purposes animating the Commerce Clause prohibits a state, in the
absence of congressional action, from participating in the market and exercising
the right to favor its own citizens over others."' 8 3 Thus, it would seem that the
District of Columbia could favor its own citizens by rejecting trash generated in
Virginia and Maryland.
If D.C. improved its two municipally-owned and managed trash transfer facilities significantly enough to accommodate all of the District's trash needs, then
D.C. could legally exclude 30-35% of its yearly waste stream that is strictly outof-state waste 1 84 because it would be a market participant. Municipal D.C. trash
transfer stations can currently only manage approximately 230,000 tons of waste
yearly, 1 85 but if the District allocated and utilized funds to create state-of-the-art
facilities, it could expand its processing and holding capacity tremendously.
D.C.'s goal as a market participant should be to eliminate many of the currently managed and environmentally unsound private trash transfer stations,
which could be accomplished if D.C. improved its own public facilities. In fact,
D.C. Council member Vincent Orange, Sr. recently introduced a bill that would
restrict waste transfer and processing to only the public transfer stations at Fort
Totten and Benning Road. 18 6 D.C. should require state-of-the art municipal
waste facilities, which would include technologies such as double-door vestibules,
(where the facility remains enclosed when a truck enters the first set of doors and
does not open until the first set of doors is again closed), air filtration, air dust
monitors and scrubbing devices.' 87
V.

STRINGENT REGULATIONS

Despite the improvements supposedly occurring in the District, according to
Myles Glasgow,
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There are no measurable 'environmental permit restrictions' governing
solid waste transfer stations and the only "market place" power is the bold,
illegal efforts of those who opened up garbage and trash transfer stations
before going to the BZA to ask for a special exception and permission to
open one up, as was the clearly known and stated policy of the Zoning Administrator, Mr. Botner, in 1993 and 1994.188
Thus, there is a need for stringent regulations, not only in place, but enforced.
A.

Flow Control

If the District continues to allow private transfer stations to operate, D.C.
could dodge interstate commerce violations by creation and enforcement of
stricter regulations in zoning and permit compliance to pinch private waste management systems' desire to import of out-of-state waste.1 89 Tighter restrictions
on the amount of accumulated waste that can be filtered through D.C. trash
transfer stations could force private waste management companies and the D.C.
government to alter its current waste management practices. Since the Carbone
decision, there has been a great deal of lobbying for legislation authorizing flow
control. 190 The National Association of Counties, National League of Cities, The
U.S. Conference of Mayors and individual governments have strongly advocated
restoration of flow control. 191 Flow control can be accomplished through economic methods, such as uniform user fees, rather than charging disposers a fee
1 92
per ton of waste that they dump.
New Jersey has had its share of issues over importation of solid waste, and as a
result, some municipalities are contracting for flow control. The local government contracts with third parties to provide collection services. Given that the
contract is a mutually voluntary agreement, New Jersey does not violate the
Commerce Clause. 193 Thus, D.C. could contract with waste management companies to only allow them to handle certain waste, ideally, only D.C.-generated
waste.
188 See Myles Glasgow, Suggestions on What to Do About D.C.'s Garbage and Trash Transfer
Stations 9, available at http://ww.ilsr.org/recycling/historic.html (last modified Mar.1998).
189 Neil Seldman, Address at Citizens' Summit on Trash Transfer Issues, Washington, D.C.
(Feb. 24, 2001). Mr. Seldman is President of The Institute for Local Self-Reliance (ILSR).
190 Geoffrey L. Oberhaus, Note, The Dormant Commerce Clause Dumps New Jersey's Solid
Waste "Flow Control" Regulations: Now What? Possible Constitutional Alternatives To the Current
"Flow Control" System, 29 RUTGERS L.J. 439 (1998).
191 McCarthy, supra note 99.
192 Oberhaustn, supra note 190. See also McCarthy, supra note 99.
193 Oberhaus, supra note 190.
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B.

Cap on Trash

Capping the amount of waste that can be accepted at transfer stations would
force private companies to choose between hauling District-generated waste and
the more costly importation of out-of-state waste. For example, in 1997, D.C.
alone generated 630,200 tons of private and commercial waste, but, private companies still imported another 366,900 tons of trash from Virginia and Maryland,
which is 997,000 tons of trash that is annually streamed through the District trash
transfer system. 194 Virginia, which is a source of on-going litigation on this issue,
restricts dumping levels at 2,000 tons per day at each landfill or the average
amount accepted by landfills in 1998, whichever is greater. 195 If D.C. were to
pass a regulation that capped the waste stream level to 700,000 tons of trash per
year, for example, the private haulers would either choose to primarily haul D.C.
waste, and, thus, cut its out-of-state waste load in half, or would travel the further
distance to Virginia and Maryland to haul its waste and forego collecting part of
the District's waste. Cost efficiency could force private waste management companies to choose the District's waste.
C.

Accountability

Holding private waste management companies accountable for non-compliance with zoning regulations and environmental controls is not unconstitutional.
The District of Columbia has not enforced its environmental regulations against
waste management companies, and thus, solid waste disposal in the District goes
virtually unregulated. For example, when Bill 13-30 was under advisement,
Myles Glasgow testified in front of the D.C. Council that "[the] Council uses
vague terms of immediate danger .... without setting clear, attainable standards,"
and "unfairly leaves the real legislation up to some bureaucrat or judge to decide
what is immediate danger. ' 196 The 500-foot buffer goes into effect next year and
should have minimum impacts on neighborhoods. No facilities, private or public,
meet this requirement. 19 7 As Justice Kennedy mentioned in Carbone, a state
"cannot discriminate against out-of-state waste, but that doesn't mean you have
to cut corners on environmental regulations within your jurisdiction."'1 98 The Supreme Court suggested in Carbone that the town could ensure proper processing
194 SOLID WASTE TRANSFER FACILITY SITE SELECTION ADVISORY PANEL, DRAFT REPORT 6
(2000).
195 VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1 - § 14.08.3.
196 COMMITTEE ON CONSUMER AND REGULATORY AFFAIRS, COMMITTEE REPORT ON BILL 1330, SOLID WASTE FACILITY PERMrr AMENDMENT ACT OF 1999 3 (1999) (prepared by Carol
Schwartz).
197 Carol D. Leonnig, Panel Advises Against D.C. Village Trash Station, WASH. POST., May 19,
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by setting specific environmental standards with which all town processors must
comply.1 99 This suggestion should be embraced in the District of Columbia.
1. Certificates of Occupancy
The District's requirement that waste management companies hold a valid
Certificate of Occupancy (CO) is an issue that has been put before the local zoning board by order of the D.C. Court of Appeals in District of Columbia v. L.G.
Industries, Inc., 200 but the decision has been delayed until the Solid Waste Advi20 1
sory Panel makes its recommendations.
In 1996, in accordance with the Temporary Act of 1994, the District denied
LGI's assertion that it was licensed by the District to operate a solid waste and
recyclable material transfer facility and that it had a valid Certificate of Occupancy that permitted it to operate a trash transfer facility. 20 2 The Department of
Consumer and Regulatory Affairs granted LGI an interim permit in August,
1996, if LGI applied within 30 days for a Certificate of Occupancy describing use
of the facility as a solid waste handling facility. 20 3 Instead of complying, LGI
moved for a Preliminary Injunction against the District. That motion was denied. 2°4 Following the denial, in May 1997, the District demanded payment for
the facility charge due under the Act.20 5 In June, 1997, L.G.I. filed a second
motion to enjoin the District from enforcing this demand for payment, and, in
1998, L.G.I. filed for a Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction
against the District after D.C. served L.G.I. with 11 administrative notices of infractions.20 6 The D.C. Superior Court issued the TRO on August 17, 1998, and
an Order Staying Administrative Proceedings on September 21, 1998.207 The
District was then enjoined and restrained from conducting any administrative enforcement or criminal proceeding, making any findings of fact and/or seeking or
imposing any penalties, fines or sanctions regarding the validity of the Certificate
of Occupancy that was issued to L.G.I. in June 1994.208 The Court of Appeals
decided in 2000 that the trial court should not have exercised its jurisdiction to
stay administrative proceedings and, thus reversed the trial court. 20 9 The Court
directed the case to the Board of Zoning Adjustment to determine the validity of
199 Id. at 1690.
200 District of Columbia v. L.G. Industries, Inc., 758 A.2d 950, 957 (2000).
201 Electronic mail from Sara Benjamin, Public Relations Specialist, Office of Zoning (Aug. 7,
2001).
202 L.G.I., 758 A.2d at 952.
203 Id.
204 Id.
205 L.G.I., 758 A.2d at 953.
206 L.G.I., 758 A.2d at 953 (2000).
207 Id.
208 Id. at 953-54.
209 Id. at 957.
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the Certificate of Occupancy for L.G. Industries, Inc., 2 10 but the BZA has yet to
reach a conclusion.
This decision may open the door to enforcement of other zoning requirements,
such as a 500 foot buffer requirement, which was already mandated in the Solid
Waste Facility Permit Amendment Act of 1998.211 Prince George's County and
other area jurisdictions already require that solid waste handling facilities be set
back at least 500 feet from the facilities' property lines to reduce the risk of infringement of solid waste handling facilities on adjacent land.212
2.

Nuisance Laws

Another way to force waste management companies to comply with environmental, health and safety regulations is to keep them accountable through actions
for violation of nuisance laws.2 13 According to community activists, the District
refuses to enforce regular nuisance laws.2 14 Common law public nuisance is "an
unreasonable interference with a right common to the general public," including
interference with the public health, safety, peace comfort or convenience.215 The
assumption could be made from all the community complaints regarding truck
traffic, vermin, and health problems in areas surrounding these transfer stations
that many of the facilities are a public nuisance. A private nuisance is "an unreasonable interference with the use or enjoyment of a property interest in land." It
is essentially a tort to an owner or possessor of land.216 Properties adjoining the
trash transfer stations would have the right to bring a nuisance action against
such facilities if the use or enjoyment of their property were being disturbed.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Environmentalism is the real commodity at issue here, not commerce, and the
trash problem in D.C. should be treated as such. Given the apathy of courts located in D.C., including, as previously mentioned, the U.S. Supreme Court, this
theory might be difficult for the courts to embrace. Although the Supreme Court
has declared that states are not allowed to engage in resource protectionism by
210
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discouraging the importation of out-of-state waste to conserve space for in-state
waste,"' not all of the justices are in agreement with that philosophy. Chief Justice Rehnquist, dissenting, vehemently admonished the Supreme Court, "Once
2 18
again, however, as in Philadelphia
and Chemical Waste Management,2 19 the
Court further cranks the dormant Commerce Clause ratchet against the States by
striking down such cost-based fees and by doing so ties the hands of the State in
addressing the vexing national problem of Solid Waste disposal., 22 0 He continues, "Nevertheless, the Court stubbornly refuses to acknowledge that a clean and
healthy environment, unthreatened by the improper disposal of solid waste is the
commodity really at issue in cases such as these."' 22 ' Rather, the Court tries to
see if the particular issue fits within another area of law, such as contracts or
commerce, and analyzes its legality and necessity through that lens. Rehnquist
was echoing an argument he had made twice before in 1992 dissenting opinions.2 22 He declared in Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. Hunt,223 "In a case
also decided today, I express my further view that States may take actions legitimately directed at the preservation of a State's natural resources, even if those
actions incidentally work to the disadvantage of some out-of-state waste generators. ' 22 4 This is the type of view that must be embraced before states will make
any progress in enforcement of environmental regulations.
District of Columbia courts need to find another perspective in which to view
environmental issues, or environmental activists will have to continue struggling
to show that an environmental vision is not invalid under another area of law.
The courts should acknowledge the principles of environmental justice that were
'225
adopted at the "First People of Color Environmental Leadership Summit
when balancing the harms and benefits of certain regulations because D.C. has
the right to have a clean and healthy environment as much as waste management
companies have a right to run a business. One of the principles adopted at the
Environmental Leadership Summit reads, "Environmental justice demands the
cessation of the production of all toxics, hazardous wastes, and radioactive materials, and that all past and current producers be held strictly accountable to the
people for detoxification and the containment at the point of production. "226
217 Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 627 (1978).
218 Id.
219 Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. Hunt, 112 S. Ct. 2009 (1992).
220 Oregon Waste Systems, Inc. v. Department of Environmental Quality, 511 U.S. 93 (1994).
221 Id.
222 Hunt, 504 U.S. 334 and Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan Dep't. of Natural
Resources, 504 U.S. 353 (1992).
223 Hunt.
224 Hunt, (reference to Fort Gratiot).
225 FIRST PEOPLE OF COLOR ENVIRONMENTAL LEADERSHIP SUMMIT, PRINCIPLES OF ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE, app. at A-1 (1991).
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Despite the seemingly uphill battle ahead, the District of Columbia has a number of available options to tackle its growing trash dilemma without violating the
Commerce Clause, despite the holdings of the D.C. courts. The District must
look at creative options and pursue them vigorously, such as enlisting the assistance of Congress, capping the amount of trash flow into the district and improving the District's municipal waste transfer facilities. There is hope for
improvement of these facilities. Mayor Williams recently rejected a proposal to
build another transfer station at D.C. Village 22 7 and a five-member panel established by the Mayor's office has recommended that the city improve and expand
the outdated Fort Totten and Benning Road stations.2 2 8
Meanwhile, the courts must acknowledge the trash problem is primarily about
the health and safety of its citizens, and the burdening cost of trash disposal on
the District, rather than commerce. Decisions regarding trash problems in D.C.
should not be based solely on economic decisions, but should take into consideration environmental justice principles and health and safety issues. As Chief Justice Rehnquist pointed out in his dissent in Oregon Waste Systems, "While I
understand that solid waste is an article of commerce, it is not a commodity sold
in the marketplace, rather it is disposal of it at a cost to the state., 2 2 9 The D.C.
judiciary must not severely limit D.C.'s ability to adequately address this issue.
Rehnquist criticized the Supreme Court majority in Oregon Waste Systems for
their failure to uphold a higher surcharge on the importation of out-of-state waste
into Oregon, scolding, "The Court, in deciding otherwise, further limits the dwindling options available to States as they contend with the environmental, health,
safety and political challenges posed by the problem of solid waste disposal in
modern society."'2 30 The fewer options D.C. is left with, the more creative it must
be to avoid the pitfalls of unconstitutional regulations but still accomplish its
objectives of a nation's Capital that is clean and healthy.

227
228
229
230

Leonnig, supra note 197.
Id.
Oregon Waste Systems, 511 U.S. 93.
Id.

